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NOTE
THE APPLICABILITY OF FLORIDA DIRECT ACTION
IN THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY
In its landmark decision in Shingleton v. Bussey1 the Supreme
Court of Florida established the nation's first entirely judicially
created right of direct action 2 and thus drastically altered established
procedures in Florida insurance litigation.3 Although initially confined
to cases involving automobile liability insurance, subsequent decisions,
most notably Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory,4 have extended the
rule announced in Shingleton to other forms of liability insurance. 5
This note considers a question not yet faced by the courts-the applicability of the principles of Shingleton and Beta Eta to cases involving
liability insurers of maritime risks.6 Special emphasis is accorded the
treatment of the Louisiana direct action statute7 in cases arising within
the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts.8
1. 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969). See Williams, Shingleton v. Bussey Doctrine: To Join
or not To Join-This is the Question, 37 INs. COUNSEL J. 418 (1970); Note, Shingleton
v. Bussey: Joinder of an Insurance Company to an Action against the Insured Through
the Court Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 DicK. L. REv. 722 (1969); 6 GA. ST. B.J. 302
(1970); 21 MERcER L. REv. 351 (1969); 48 TEXAS L. Rrv. 242 (1969); 22 U. FLA. L. REV.
145 (1969); 23 U. MAMI L. REv. 652 (1969); 38 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 138 (1969); 1970 UTAH
L. REv. 468; Note, Judicial Creation of Direct Action against Automobile Liability
Insurers: Shingleton v. Bussey, 23 VAND. L. REv. 631 (1970); 15 VILL. L. REV. 257 (1969).
2. The right of direct action, as employed in Florida, allows a plaintiff to join
the defendant's liability insurer as a party defendant in an action in which the insurer
may ultimately be obligated to pay. See Conley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
342 F. Supp. 379 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Godshall v. Unigard Ins. Co., 267 So. 2d 383
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
3. See Artille v. Davidson, 170 So. 707 (Fla. 1936); Thompson v. Safeco Ins. Co. of
America, 199 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
4. 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1970) (negligence in maintenance of fraternity house). The
language of Beta Eta was, at one point, quite broad: "The principles announced in
Shingleton v. Bussey . . . are applicable not only to automobile liability insurance but
also to other forms of liability insurance." Id. at 165.
5. See, e.g., Shipman v. Kinderman, 232 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970)
(applicable to professional malpractice insurance); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 231
So. 2d 235 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (applicable to homeowner's insurance).
6. In Quinones v. Coral Rock, Inc., 258 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972), the
court recognized the application of Shingleton and Beta Eta to a personal injury action
brought on a maritime insurance policy in state court. The nature of that action, however, was inapposite to the maritime actions considered in this note. The action was
not an admiralty proceeding and neither concursus nor the federal Limited Liability
Act was involved.
7. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 655 (Supp. 1973).
8. Article III, § 2, of the Constitution extends the judicial power of the United
States "to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970)
provides in part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of
the States, of:
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It should be noted initially that while direct action is statutory
in Louisiana and a product of judicial decision in Florida, the distinction is of little significance in view of the similar policy basis
upon which they are founded-"that an insurance policy against
liability to the public is not issued primarily for the protection of
the insured, but for the protection of the general public."9 Similarly,
the courts of both states have characterized direct action as a procedural rather than a substantive right. 10
I. Cushing AND

CONFLICTING STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS

In 1954 the Supreme Court decided Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Cushing." In what has been described as the riddle of the Jane Smith,
and as the "Great Undecided Problem,"' 12 the Court faced the question of whether the Louisiana direct action statute could apply in
a case involving a maritime insurance contract without invading "an
area of maritime jurisdiction withdrawn from the States,"' 3 as expressed in the Limited Liability Act.14 The towboat Jane Smith had
(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all
cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.
9. Lewis v. Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co., 107 F. Supp. 465, 471 (W.D. La. 1952). The
public protection rationale employed in Louisiana is consonant with the third party beneficiary approach of Shingleton. Referring to Gothberg v. Nemerovski, 208 N.E.2d 12 (Ill.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1965), the Shingleton court stated:
We have quoted extensively from the Illinois Appellate Court opinion because
its reasoning is enlightening in demonstrating that the third party beneficiary
doctrine encompasses, substantively speaking, a cause of action against an insurer
in favor of members of the public injured through acts of an insured.
223 So. 2d at 716.
10. See Finn v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 141 So. 2d 852, 864 (La. 2d Cir.
Ct. App. 1962); Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 230 So. 2d 495, 499 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App.), modified, 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1970); Russell v. Orange County, 237 So. 2d 192,
193 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
Unlike the right created in Shingleton, the right created under the Louisiana statute
has not enjoyed consistent interpretations, and this vacillation has been reflected in
the efforts of the federal courts to ascertain Louisiana's perception of its right of
direct action. See Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 51 (1954); Collins
v. American Auto Ins. Co., 230 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1956); Shapiro v. Aetna Cas. & Surety
Co., 234 F. Supp. 41 (N.D. Ga. 1963), afJ'd, 337 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1964). Wisconsin's
direct action statute has been interpreted by a federal district court as conferring a
substantive right. See Swanson v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 275 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ill. 1967);
Posner v. Travelers Ins. Co., 244 F. Supp. 865 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
11. 347 U.S. 409 (1954).
12. Guillot v. Cenac Towing Co., 366 F.2d 898, 900 (5th Cir. 1966).
13. 347 U.S. at 413.
14. 46 U.S.C. § § 181-96 (1970). 46 U.S.C. § 183 (a) (1970) provides in part:
The liability of the owner of any vessel . . . for any loss, damage, or injury by
dollision . . . without the privity or knowledge of such owner . . . shall not . . .
exceed the amount or value of the interest of such owner in such vessel, and her
freight then pending.
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struck a cement pier on the Atchafalaya River in Louisiana and
capsized. The shipowner and charterer filed admiralty petitions in
federal district court to limit their liability. Subsequently, in the same
district court, the representatives of five seamen who were drowned in
the mishap sued the liability insurers of the shipowner and charterer.
Claimants relied upon the Louisiana direct action statute, basing
jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship. On appeal from the direct
action, the Supreme Court framed the question presented as whether
the "application of the Louisiana statute . ..would violate '. . . the
Limited Liability Act and the constitutional grant to the federal government of exclusive jurisdiction in maritime matters.' "s The Court
then proceeded to split four-one-four in its decision.
In an opinion joined in by Justices Reed, Jackson and Burton,
Justice Frankfurter found a complete conflict between the state and
federal laws for four reasons. First, direct action was viewed as
antagonistic to one purpose of the Limited Liability Act-that all
claims against a shipowner be disposed of in a single proceeding.16
Because the several claimants could sue the liability insurer separately
and independently of the limitation proceeding, the Court feared that
"[t]he ship's company would be subject to call as witnesses in more
than one proceeding, perhaps in diverse forums," that "[c]onflicting
judgments might result," and that "[u]ltimate recoveries might vary
from the proportions contemplated by the statute. ' '1 Secondly, the
Court noted that direct action was potentially harmful to injured
claimants. Concursus, said the Court, is not for the exclusive benefit
of the shipowner, but functions to assure all claimants an "equal
footing" to extract a pro rata share of their damages.18 Permitting
direct action would allow those claimants relying on direct action to
"drain away part or all of the insurance proceeds" to the prejudice
of those relying upon the limitation proceeding.19 Thirdly, the Court
thought that the inability of insurers to rely upon the limited liability
of their insured would force insurers to increase their premiums to
the detriment of the shipowner-"the very class sought to be benefited by the [Limited Liability Act]."" ° The Court's fourth concern
was that direct action would result in an obviation of the benefit of
liability insurance to the shipowner. Were the claimants to recover
more than the face amount of the policies, the insurers would be
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

347 U.S. at 412.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 417.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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exonerated and the shipowner liable up to the value of the vessel
21
without the benefit of his insurance.

In his concurrence Justice Clark believed the conflict envisioned
by the Frankfurter faction could be easily avoided by ordering the
limitation proceeding to take place first.2 2 Justice Clark emphasized
the purpose of the Limited Liability Act-"to encourage investment
in American ships by placing a limitation upon the personal liability
of the shipowner." 23 He felt that by allowing the shipowner to have
the concursus held before the direct action, the shipowner would
obtain the benefit of his insurance, and all that the Act was intended
to protect would be protected."
Justice Black, writing for the remainder of the Court, saw no
state-federal conflict. He read the Limited Liability Act to mean
only that the shipowner's personal liability was to be limited to the
amount of the vessel's value and that the limitation was not intended
to apply to proceeds from liability insurance. To allow full exoneration of the insurer through direct action, followed by recovery from
the shipowner to the extent permitted by the Act, was viewed as
25
fully consistent with the purpose of the Act.
To avoid a deadlock the Frankfurter faction aligned with Justice
Clark, and the case was remanded to be continued until the limitation
proceeding was completed.2 6 Commentators have experienced understandable difficulty in assessing the precise significance, if any, of
Cushing, other than to speculate that it "presumably establishes a procedure to be followed by lower courts in handling similar cases
until the Supreme Court further clarifies the issues."27 From the viewpoint of the shipowner the immediate importance of Cushing was its
recognition of his right to satisfy the claimants' judgments in the
concursus from the proceeds of his liability insurance policy.28 His
21. Id. at 417-18.
22. The owner's liability under the limitation proceeding would be discharged to
the extent covered by the policy; thereafter direct actions could be instituted to reach
the remaining coverage of the policy, if any. Id. at 425.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

423.
425-27.
432-37.
423.

G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTy § 10-31, at 715 (1957).
28. Cf. The City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468 (1886) (proceeds from hull insurance
policy not part of owner's interest in ship for purposes of limitation proceeding).
Justice Clark, in his Cushing concurrence, stated:
Though the holding in The City of Norwich does not control, I think that
the reasoning of that case is pertinent; in other words, the owner of the ship
has the same right to protect his investment in the ship by insurance against
damage claims arising in its operation and which are chargeable to it as he has
27.
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right to indemnification was, in effect, procedurally guaranteed. 29 The

interests of the injured parties were also served because a claimant's
potential recovery was increased from the bare value of the damaged
vessel, as determined in the limitation proceedings, to the policy limits
of the insurance contract.3 0
The logical implication of Cushing, despite its ambiguity, is that
the application of a state right of direct action against a maritime
liability insurer does not inevitably involve an exclusively maritime
3
substantive concept. '
II.

RECENT TREATMENT OF DIRECT ACTION IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS

In 1969, in a case analogous to Cushing and involving essentially
the same Louisiana statute,3 2 the Fifth Circuit found that "any conflict
between the direct action statute and federal provision for a concursus of claims in admiralty is so minimal as to be insignificant."33
to protect his investment from damage to the ship itself.
347 U.S. at 424 (footnote omitted).
29. In the conclusion of his opinion Justice Frankfurter summarized his perception
of Justice Clark's proposal thusly:
For the reasons stated in his opinion, MR. JUSTICE CLARK agrees that the direct
action suits should not be permitted to impair the shipowner's and charterer's
right to idemnification, but he would allow the District Court to adjudicate the
liability of the petitioners [insurers] to the respondents [direct action claimants]
after the limitation proceeding has run its course.

347 U.S. at 422-23.
The implications of Justice Clark's concurrence were noted by District Judge Ellis
in Alcoa Steamship Co. v. Charles Ferran & Co., 251 F. Supp. 823, 828 (E.D. La.

1966):
In so stating his position, Mr. Justice Clark created two majority decisions in
one case. On the one hand, by concluding inter alia that "limitation" and "direct
action" could co-exist, he joined Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas
and Minton in holding that the Louisiana Direct Action Statute did not invariably or irreconciliably conflict with the federal limitation scheme-the substantive question. On the other hand, by expressly stating that the limitation proceeding should be concluded prior to a determination of the direct actions, ...
he was joined by Justices Frankfurter, Reed, Jackson and Burton in establishing
the sequence in which the two would be determined-the procedural question.
30. No consensus was reached, however, on the actual liability of the insurer under
the applicable Louisiana law. 347 U.S. at 425 (Clark, J., concurring).
31. As noted by Justice Clark in Cushing, "[i]n administering the Limited Liability
Act the Court can easily avoid a clear conflict between it and the direct action statute."
Id. at 423.
32. The Louisiana Insurance Code has undergone some minor revisions since
1954, none of which are pertinent to this discussion.
33. Olympic Towing Corp. v. Nebel Towing Co., 419 F.2d 230, 235 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). The court read Cushing as implicitly holding that
"the policy underlying the concursus is not so strong or pervasive as to abrogate rights
under the direct action statute." Id.
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In consideration of the similar policy bases (previously noted) upon
which the rights of direct action in Louisiana and Florida are founded,
it seems reasonable to expect that a claimant seeking to avail himself
of the Florida version in a maritime case will receive the same sympathetic hearing in the federal courts as have his Louisiana predecessors.
Solicitude has, for example, already been displayed for the Puerto
35
3 4
Rico direct action statute in Torres v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co.,
where the court relied upon the rationale contained in Cushing and
subsequent decisions 6 to allow the claimant to proceed with his direct
action against the insurer prior to any disposition in the limitation
proceeding.
Such decisions reflect a tendency in maritime insurance litigation
to determine policy liability upon state substantive rules unless the
37
issues involve the application of a generally accepted admiralty rule.
This approach may have evolved from the Supreme Court's statement
in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.,35 regarding the

concurrent jurisdiction of state courts over maritime causes of action:
Although the corpus of admiralty law is federal in the sense
that it derives from the implications of Article III evolved by the
courts, to claim that all enforced rights pertaining to matters maritime are rooted in federal law is a destructive oversimplification
of the highly intricate interplay of the State and the National Government in their regulation of maritime commerce. It is true that
state law must yield to the needs of a uniform federal maritime law
34. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 26, § 2001 (1958).
35. 275 F. Supp. 784 (D.P.R. 1967). With regard to the similarity between the
Louisiana and Puerto Rican statutes, the court stated:
A comparison of the decisions in Louisiana . . . with the decisions in Puerto Rico
• . . persuades me that the legislative history of the Puerto Rico direct action
statute . . . leaves no room for argument that the legislature . . . intended that
its direct action statute be of any different force and effect whatsoever than the
direct action statute of Louisiana.
Id. at 789.
36. See, e.g., Alcoa Steamship Co. v. Charles Ferran & Co., 251 F. Supp. 823 (E.D.
La. 1966); In re Independent Towing Co., 242 F. Supp. 950 (E.D. La. 1965). See also
Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955); 7 HOUSTON L. REV.
703, 706 (1970). In the text of the Wilburn opinion, the Court explained:
Congress has been exceedingly cautious about disturbing this system [referring to
the generally diverse system of insurance], even as to marine insurance where
congressional power is undoubted. We, like Congress, leave the regulation of
marine insurance where it has been-with the states.
348 U.S. at 321 (footnote omitted).
37. See Purofied Down Prods. Corp. v. Travelers Fire Ins. Co., 278 F.2d 439 (2d
Cir. 1960); 5 WILLIAMErrE L.J. 529 (1969). Compare Bechkam v. Reed, 217 F. Supp.
749 (S.D. Tex. 1963), with Bell v. Tug Shrike, 332 F.2d 330 (4th Cir. 1964).
38. 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
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when this Court finds inroads on a harmonious system. But this
limitation still leaves the States a wide scope.39
Recognition of a claimant's right to join a shipowner and his liability
insurer as codefendants pursuant to Shingleton and Beta Eta seems
well within the scope of permissible state regulation in the maritime
field. The treatment of the Louisiana direct action statute in the
federal courts reflects the receptivity of those courts to the application
of the right the statute creates and to the public policies it serves. One
federal court has already assumed the same basic posture toward
Florida's right of direct action in a case not involving a maritime
claim. In Barrios v. Dade County,40 the plaintiff accident victim sued
the carrier of the Miami International Airport in New York federal
district court. The court utilized two New York Court of Appeals decisions as its bases for permitting a direct action against the liability
42
41
carrier: Seider v. Roth and Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co.
Seider was a personal injury action arising out of an automobile
accident occurring in Vermont. The insurer, a New York corporation,
suffered an attachment, as a debt reachable by plaintiff, of its contractual obligation to defend and indemnify the defendant insured. The
lower court allowed the action although no judgment of negligence or
liability had been obtained against the insured. In permitting the
action to proceed, the court of appeals observed:
It is said that by [affirming] we would be setting up a "direct
action" against the insurer. That is true to the extent only that
affirmance will put jurisdiction in New York State and require the
insurer to defend here, not because of a debt owing by it to the
defendant has been attached but because by its policy it has agreed
to defend in any place where jurisdiction is obtained against its
43
insured.
The Barrios court read Seider to indicate that the public policy of
New York would not prohibit a direct action against a carrier although New York had no right of direct action.44
39. Id. at 373. But cf. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970)
(rejected the notion that state law must govern in the absence of a federal statute on
a maritime rule regarding wrongful death); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205
(1917) (New York State Workmen's Compensation Statute could not be constitutionally
applied where an accidental death occurred on a vessel afloat in navigable waters within
New York's boundaries).
40. 310 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
41. 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
42. 204 N.E.2d 622, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1965).
43. 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
44. 310 F. Supp. at 747.
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In Oltarsh the court of appeals permitted the maintenance in New
York of a direct action brought under the Puerto Rico direct action
statute by New York residents injured in Puerto Rico. The action
was allowed, on the basis of the New York conflict of laws doctrine,
to enforce a substantive right of the plaintiffs because Puerto Rico's
direct action statute had been construed as creating a substantive
right.4 5 The Barrios court read Oltarsh as implying that not only
would New York policy not be offended by direct action suits, but
that such suits would probably be permitted in New York if allowed
in the situs state. The court found Oltarsh broad enough to permit
direct actions against carriers in New York if the situs state recognized such suits either by statute or judicial decision. Barrios is significant as indicative of the treatment the Florida right of direct
action may receive in the federal courts and for possibly portending
the federal courts' acceptance of Shingleton as establishing a substantive right despite its characterization by the Florida courts as
creating a procedural right. The decision also underscores the practical
insignificance of a statutory-case law distinction between the bases
of direct action.

46

Cushing imposed a procedural restriction requiring that a final
concursus determination be reached before any claimant may sue the
insurer. Because consursus may consume a substantial period of time
and thus delay a claimant's right to proceed against the insurer, the
47
decision has been viewed as prejudicial to claimants.
Recent decisions in the Fifth Circuit have tracked the broad guidelines suggested by Justice Clark in Cushing and seem to vindicate the
views of some commentators that the decision established a procedure
4
to be followed absent clarification by the Supreme Court. " In several

decisions the courts have grappled with the procedural chronology promulgated in Cushing. In 1957 the rule of concursus before direct
45. See id. at 748 n.15.
46. In Barrios the defendant insurer sought dismissal of the action on the ground
that, inter alia, Florida had no direct action statute. 310 F. Supp. at 747. The court,
rejecting defendant's argument, found "[t]hat [the fact that] the right was 'judicially'
rather [than] 'legislatively' created does not detract from its force." Id. at 748.
47. See generally 19 ALBANY L. REV. 108 (1955); 68 HARV. L. REV. 157 (1954); 29
TUL. L. REV. 139 (1954); 22 U. CI. L. REV. 550 (1955); 103 U. PA. L. REV. 263 (1954);
40 VA. L. REV. 621 (1954).
48. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 10-31, at 715 (1957);
Mecom v. Shell Oil Co., 376 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1967); Guillot v. Cenac Towing Co., 366
F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1966); Coleman v. Jahncke Serv., Inc., 341 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1965);
Ex parte Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. 322 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1963) (staying a direct
action in federal district court in Louisiana pending a final determination in a Texas
limitation proceeding); Pershing Auto Rentals, Inc. v. Gaffney, 279 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1960).
Cf. Lovless v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 218 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1955).

1973]

DIRiEcT ACTION IN

ADMIRALTY

action was qualified in Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn.49 The Court re-

lied upon Cushing in holding that a concursus or limitation proceeding
is necessary only where the amount in the limitation fund may not
be sufficient to discharge the claims pending against the vessel. The
Court indicated that when the limitation fund might prove insufficient, the concursus is to be considered "vital" to the protection of
the shipowner's statutory rights.5 0 In In re Independent Towing Co.,51

the direct action and limitation proceeding were consolidated in federal
district court. The direct action was not stayed, the court indicating
that the evidence presented would be sufficient to determine the shipowner's right to limit his liability. The court proceeded on the assumption that if the total of all pending claims should be less than
the policy limits of the insurance contract involved, then the limitation proceeding would be rendered moot. The court elaborated a
number of guidelines intended to accord the shipowner the full
protection of his insurance while allowing the claimants a means for
full recovery of the insurance proceeds.5 2 Thus, the limitation-beforedirect-action rule is no longer regarded as an absolute procedural
right and will be invoked only where it appears that the shipowner's
limitation rights will be threatened or if the direct action may otherwise unreasonably interfere with the limitation proceeding. 5 The
result is the availability of a number of procedural alternatives to the
claimant, depending upon each fact situation.
The Florida courts have not read Shingleton or Beta Eta as authorizing a plaintiff to pursue an insurer in a separate action. In contrast
to the recognized Louisiana practice, 54 a plaintiff in Florida must
49. 354 U.S. 147 (1957). The Court affirmed the order of a federal court granting
a motion to lift a restraining order entered in limitation proceedings, enabling the
claimant to bring a separate action in state court in New York for the death of
claimant's husband. The case did not involve application of any state right of direct
action.
50. Id. at 154.
51. 242 F. Supp. 950 (E.D. La. 1965).
52. Id. at 956.
53. Olympic Towing Corp. v. Nebel Towing Co., 419 F.2d 230, 235 n.17 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). See Guillot v. Cenac Towing Co., 366 F.2d 898
(5th Cir. 1966); Ex parte Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1963);
Torres v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 275 F. Supp. 784 (D.P.R. 1967); Alcoa Steamship Co.
v. Charles Ferran & Co., 251 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. La. 1966), afj'd, 383 F.2d 46 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 836 (1968). Cf. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. M/V John E. Coon,
207 F. Supp. 45 (E.D. La. 1962) (Louisiana direct action suits allowed to continue during
pendency of limitation proceeding in Texas).
54. See Bue, Cushing Revealed-The Grisly Spectre Is Precariously Defined as to
Size and Shape, 37 INS. COUNSEL J. 401, 406 (1970):
Louisiana has, perhaps, the broadest of such statutes, although various other
states employ the same basic principles. . . . The aggrieved party may sue the
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join the insured and his liability insurer as party defendants, the substantive liability of the latter being dependent upon that of the
former. 5 But a Florida claimant retains the option of proceeding
against the shipowner and his insurer in either federal or state court.
Under Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn,5s a claimant could proceed in
state court with a direct action, provided the aggregate of claims
against the vessel did not exceed the limitation fund.5 7 If all claims
were consolidated in federal district court and their total found not
to exceed the policy limits of the insurance contract, the direct actions
could be prosecuted to judgment without incurring delay to allow a
prior consursus proceeding. This procedure, first utilized by a federal
district court in In re Independent Towing Co.,5a has been criticized

on the ground that the admiralty court cannot adequately protect the
statutory rights of the shipowner where claimants are also proceeding
in separate actions in the state courts. This question was apparently
resolved, however, in Olympic Towing Corp. v. Nebel Towing Co.,59
where the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the injunctive power of the
federal courts to prevent claimants from proceeding with direct actions

insurer alone without making the assured a party defendant "whether the policy
of insurance . . . was written or delivered in the State of Louisiana or not and
whether or not such policy contains a provision forbidding such direct action,
provided that the accident or injury occurred within the State of Louisiana."
The internal quote is taken from LA. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 655 (1958).
55. See Russell v. Orange County, 237 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
But cf. Maxwell v. Southern Am. Fire Ins. Co., 235 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1970), where the injured party was permitted to sue the insurer in contract as a third
party beneficiary. The court permitted the action on the separate, contractual medical
coverage section of the homeowner's policy. The court did not decide whether such
a procedure could be invoked when suit is brought under the liability section of an
insurance policy:
The distinction between [Shingleton and Beta Eta] . . . and this case is that
plaintiff here is not attempting to recover for the alleged negligence of the
insured under the liability portion of the policy but is attempting a direct
action solely against the insurer as a third party beneficiary under the contract
provisions of the medical coverage portion of the insurance policy.
Id. at 770.
56. 354 U.S. 147 (1957).
57. Justice Clark, writing for the Court in Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn, observed:
It follows that there can be no reason why a shipowner, under such conditions,
should be treated any more favorably than an airline, bus or railroad company.
None of them can force a damage claimant to trial without a jury. They, too,
must suffer a multiplicity of suits. Likewise, the shipowner, so long as his claim of
limited liability is not jeopardized, is subject to all common-law remedies available against other parties in damage actions.
354 U.S. at 153.
58. 242 F. Supp. 950 (E.D. La. 1965).
59. 419 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
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in state courts where necessary "to protect rights under both the state
and federal statutes."' 0
In 1964 Congress limited the jurisdiction of the federal courts
to hear direct action suits by providing that an insurer defendant in
a direct action assumes the citizenship of its insured. 61 Thus, if the
citizenship of the plaintiff coincides with that of the insured or any of
those of the insurer, a federal court would be precluded from entertaining the action where diversity is urged as the ground for jurisdiction. For the time being this jurisdictional provision will probably
have no effect upon a potential direct action in Florida since the
provision by its own terms does not apply when the action is brought
against both the insurer and the insured. This is not the case, however,
in Louisiana, where a claimant may proceed independently against the
liability insurer. In Olympic Towing this diversity problem was
avoided because the action was filed prior to the effective date of the
code amendment. The restriction on diversity jurisdiction in section
1332 (c) is no impediment to the claimant who institutes an action
against a shipowner and insurer jointly, or who pursues his remedy
in state court. In addition, an action on a marine insurance policy can,
of course, always be maintained in federal court under section 1333,
regardless of diversity, as an action upon a maritime contract, although by so proceeding the plaintiff necessarily foregoes the right
to a jury trial available under section 1332.62
60.

Id. at 235. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970) provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings
in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1970) provides in part:
[I]n any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract of liability insurance, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to which action the insured
is not joined as a party-defendant, such insurer shall be deemed a citizen of the
State of which the insured is a citizen, as well as of any State by which the
insurer has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of
business.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970) provides a grant of exclusive, original jurisdiction of
admiralty claims to the federal district courts without regard to diversity of citizenship
or amount in controversy.
In the landmark decision of DeLovio v. Boit, [7 F. Cas. 418, (No. 3776) (D.
Mass.),] decided in 1815, Justice Story made clear that marine insurance policies
were maritime contracts and, therefore, within the admiralty jurisdiction. ...
The principle espoused by Justice Story has never been seriously challenged,
and it is settled today that insurance coverage on a vessel engaged in navigation
or commerce is clearly within the scope of admiralty jurisdiction and that, consequently, claims for damages arising out of such contracts, whether relating to
loss or to actions for recovery of premiums, are maritime in nature.
7A MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f .255[1], at 3021 (2d ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted). See
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Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1 (1870); Insurance Co. of North America
v. Langan Constr. Co., 327 F. Supp. 567 (S.D. Ala. 1971); G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE
LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 2-1, at 48 (1957). Thus it would seem that the exclusive grant of
jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970) would confer upon federal courts the authority to
fashion a maritime insurance law. However, in Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955), the Court held that state substantive law applied in an action
for recovery under a maritime insurance policy. Although jurisdiction was based on
diversity, the Court stated:
Since the insurance policy here sued on is a maritime contract the Admiralty
Clause of the Constitution brings it within federal jurisdiction. . . . But it
does not follow, as the courts below seem to think, that every term in every
maritime contract can only be controlled by some federally defined admiralty
rule.
Id. at 313. The Court stressed the power of the states to regulate insurance, absent
Congressional regulations to the contrary. Id. at 313-14, 319. Finding no established federal admiralty rule governing the questions involved in the case, the Court chose not
to fashion a judicial remedy but instead to leave the regulation of maritime insurance
with the states. Id. at 320-21. Accord, Liman v. American S.S. Owners Mut. Protection
& Indem. Ass'n, 299 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 417 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1969).
Applying the Wilburn rationale it would appear that state substantive law would
continue to be applicable in maritime insurance actions even if jurisdiction were based
on 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970), provided there were no contrary congressional regulations.
Indeed, federal forums for direct actions would be more easily obtainable than at
present, since the restriction imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1970) would be obviated.
The Constitution neither forbids nor requires a jury trial in cases within the admiralty
jurisdiction, and Congress has not created such a statutory right for proceedings brought
under § 1333. The only exception to this rule is contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1970),
which grants a jury trial upon demand of either party in actions sounding in tort or in
contract involving vessels weighing over twenty tons operating on the Great Lakes. See 7A
MooRE, FEDERAL PRACrICE ff .59[3], at 417 (2d ed. 1971).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure subsection 9(h), added in 1966, allows a claimant
bringing suit on an in personam claim cognizable under either federal diversity jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1332) or under admiralty jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1333) to elect to have
his action treated as one in admiralty. If he elects to proceed in admiralty, Rule 38(e)
makes it clear that a jury trial is not available, except as provided by statute. If no
election is made, there is a right to a jury trial. See Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v.
Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355 (1962); Green v. Ross, 338 F. Supp. 365 (S.D. Fla.
1972); Johnson v. Venezuelan Line S.S. Co., 314 F. Supp. 1404 (E.D. La. 1970); Sanderlin
v. Old Dominion Stevedoring Co., 281 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Va. 1968); Doughty v. Nebel
Towing Co., 270 F. Supp. 957 (E.D. La. 1967).
The election is, of course, only available when dual jurisdictional grounds are present.
Rule 9(h) expressly provides that "[i]f the claim is cognizable only in admiralty it is an
admiralty or maritime claim for those purposes whether so identified or not," and Rule
38(e) provides that "[t]hese rules shall not be construed to create a right to trial by jury
of the issues in an admiralty or maritime claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h)." See
Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 469 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1972); McCrary v. Seatrain Lines,
Inc., 469 F.2d 666 (9th Cir. 1972).
Also, an election under Rule 9(h) is not necessarily final. The rule provides that the
"amendment of a pleading to add or withdraw an identifying statement is governed by
the principles of Rule 15." Rule 15, authorizing liberal amendment to pleadings, provides
in part:
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a
responsive pleading is served . . . . Otherwise a party may amend . . . only by
leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely

1973]

DIREcr ACTION

IN ADMIRALTY

One other issue not yet resolved is the availability to the insurer
of a personal defense of the insured when proceeded against in a
Florida direct action. In Cushing Justice Frankfurter addressed the
issue in the admiralty context indicating that limitation of liability,
"used as a term of art," is not available as a defense to a liability underwriter. 63 Applicable statutory language in Louisiana specifically provides that a codebtor "can not plead such exceptions defenses as are
merely personal to some of the other codebtors."6 4 The admiralty courts
have reaffirmed Justice Frankfurter's opinion that the limited liability
act is a defense solely intended for, and thus strictly personal to, the
shipowner (and therefore unavailable to his liability insurer in a
Louisiana direct action).65 Further clarification appeared in Alcoa
Steamship Co. v. Charles Ferran & Co.,6 6 where the court explained
that, although an insurer cannot avail himself of any personal defense
of the insured (e.g., limited liability), he can benefit from the contractual defenses of the insured. 67 The statement leaves at least one
possible avenue of limited liability open to the insurer. In Olympic
Towing the same court dealt with the long-standing shipowners' criticism that allowing direct actions against their liability underwriters
would eventually result in higher premiums. The court concluded that
"the possibility of higher premiums is an insufficient basis for per68
mitting an insurer to limit its liability."
III. CONCLUSION

The implications of the application of the Florida right of direct
action to maritime cases are great. Central to the holding in Shingleton was a recognition of the strong public interest in providing adequate remedies to persons injured in automobile mishaps. That concept was extended in Beta Eta to promote expeditious relief for the
injured in other activities covered by liability insurance. The needs
given when justice so requires....
For a good, recent discussion of many of these points, see Williams v. Shipping Corp. of
India, 354 F. Supp. 626 (S.D. Ga. 1973).
63. 347 U.S. at 421-22.
64. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2098 (1870). See Bue, supra note 54, at 410.
65. See In re Independent Towing Co., 242 F. Supp. 850 (E.D. La. 1965) (opinion
traces historical development, and concludes that limited liability is unavailable as
defense to shipowner's liability insurer); Torres v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 275 F.
Supp. 784 (D.P.R. 1967) (for purposes of the Puerto Rican direct action statute limitation is a personal defense).
66. 383 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1967).
67. The contract in Alcoa included a customary $300,000 limit on the ship repair
contractor's liability. The court notes no objection to the use by an insurer of a limitation
of liability "agreed to by parties in relatively equal bargaining positions." Id. at 56.
68. 419 F.2d at 236.
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that those decisions recognized and sought to alleviate are no less
present in cases involving maritime misfortunes. It is time for the
courts to refashion the right created in Shingleton to more fully satisfy public needs. It has been persuasively suggested that the insured
be considered a necessary rather than an indispensable party in Florida
direct actions. 69 The proposal is valuable because such a change would
permit the claimant to proceed with an action in the absence of the
insured, thereby improving his opportunity for recovery. As a practical matter, an injured party may be more successful in obtaining
jurisdiction over a marine insurer, who is usually present in several
jurisdictions for purposes of service of process, than over the vessel
involved, which may not remain in Florida waters.7 0 Similar logic
might be invoked to create a remedy when a ship deposits pollutants
in Florida waters and then returns to the open sea.7 '
It is most important to recognize that considerations of public
policy are highly appropriate to a determination of the questions and
issues presented herein. It must, of course, be conceded that conflicting policies underlie the Limited Liability Act and the right of
direct action. The former serves the express purpose of protecting the
American shipping industry from unreasonably burdensome liabilities,
while the latter serves to promote and protect the interests of an injured party. It has been persuasively suggested that, given the modern
financially sophisticated shipping industry, the objectives sought to be
2
achieved through direct action should now be considered primary.
THOMAS F. IcARD, JR.
69. 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 145, 146-48 (1969).
70. Cf. Note, Judicial Creation of Direct Actions against Automobile Liability Insurers: Shingleton v. Bussey, 23 VAND. L. R.Ev. 631, 643 (1970).
71. Compare Taylor v. Fishing Tools, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 666 (E.D. La. 1967) (Louisiana direct action statute found applicable in injury case arising on off-shore drilling
platform), with American Waterway Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F. Supp. 1241 (M.D.
Fla. 1971), rev'd, 93 S. Ct. 1590 (1973) (upholding the Florida Oil Spill Prevention and
Pollution Control Act).
72. See Kierr, The Effect of Direct Action Statutes on P & I Insurance, on Various
Other Insurances of Maritime Liabilities, and on Limitation of Shipowners' Liability,
43 Tiu. L. REv. 639 (1969).

